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 The hypothesis that var(e) was constant across states
 would be rejected at the 0.05 level for the independent
 agency sample using a likelihood ratio test. It would not
 be rejected at the 0.10 level for the direct writers.
 For the independent agency insurers, bli ranged from
 - 0.008 to 0.149. The range for direct writers was 0.020
 to 0.049.14 The five states with the largest weighted-
 average (by premiums) bli s for the groups (in parenthe-
 ses) were New Hampshire (0.111), New Jersey (0.068),
 North Carolina (0.061), Rhode Island (0.059), and Maine
 (0.055). The five states with the smallest values were
 Tennessee (0.007), Arkansas (0.013), New York (0.022),
 Nebraska (0.022), and Iowa (0.025). Research is needed
 to explain this variation. It also would be desirable to
 estimate the effect of rate regulation on expected losses,
 to examine potential differences in its impact across
 consumer groups, and to investigate nonprice responses
 to restrictive rate regulation in this market.
 14 The correlation between the estimates for the groups was
 0.75.
 REFERENCES
 D'Arcy, Stephen, "An Economic Theory of Insurance Regu-
 lation," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1982.
 Grabowski, Henry, W. Kip Viscusi, and William Evans, "The
 Effects of Regulation on the Price and Availability of
 Automobile Insurance," paper presented at Nineteenth
 International Atlantic Economic Conference, Rome,
 Italy, March 1985.
 Griffiths, William, "Estimation of Actual Response Coeffi-
 cients in the Hildreth-Houck Random Coefficient
 Model," Journal of the American Statistical Association
 67 (Sept. 1972), 633-635.
 Harrington, Scott, "Estimating the Impact of Prior Approval
 Regulation on Auto Insurance Rates," Working Paper
 No. 84-3, Center for Research on Risk and Insurance,
 University of Pennsylvania, July 1984a.
 , "The Impact of Rate Regulation on Prices and Un-
 derwriting Results in the Property-Liability Insurance
 Industry: A Survey," Journal of Risk and Insurance 51
 (Dec. 1984b), 577-623.
 Ippolito, Richard, "The Effects of Price Regulation in the
 Automobile Insurance Industry," Journal of Law and
 Economics 22 (Apr. 1979), 55-89.
 Joskow, Paul, "Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the
 Property-Liability Insurance Industry," Bell Journal of
 Economics and Management Science 4 (Autumn 1973),
 375-427.
 , "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural
 Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regu-
 lation," Journal of Law and Economics 17 (Oct. 1974),
 291-327.
 Pauly, Mark, Paul Kleindorfer, and Howard Kunreuther,
 "Regulation and Quality Competition in the U.S. In-
 surance Industry," in J. Finsinger and M. Pauly (eds.),
 The Economics of Insurance Regulation (London: Mac-
 millan Press, 1986).
 Smallwood, Dennis, "Competition, Regulation, and Product
 Quality in the Automobile Insurance Industry," in
 Almarin Phillips (ed.), Promoting Competition in Regu-
 lated Markets (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings In-
 stitution, 1975).
 U.S. General Accounting Office, Issues and Needed Improve-
 ments in State Regulation of the Insurance Business
 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office,
 1979).
 TYING REQUIREMENTS IN MARKETS WITH MANY SELLERS:
 THE CONTACT LENS INDUSTRY
 Deborah Haas-Wilson*
 Abstract-The asymmetric information characterizing markets
 for professional services has been used to justify tying require-
 ments and other restrictions on the business practices of pro-
 fessionals. In this paper the prices and quality effects of state
 restrictions that prohibit the fitting of contact lenses by inde-
 pendent opticians and thereby tie the sale of contact lenses to
 the services of ophthalmologists and optometrists are esti-
 mated. The results suggest that prices are significantly higher in
 markets with tying requirements, controlling for differences in
 quality and variations in other state commercial practice re-
 strictions. The tying requirements and the commercial practice
 restrictions, however, appear to have statistically insignificant
 effects on quality.
 While economists and the courts have focused on the
 questionable uses of tying requirements by sellers with
 market power in concentrated markets, questionable
 tying requirements are also observed in markets with
 many sellers. For example, a recent Federal Trade Com-
 mission (FTC) regulation prohibited funeral directors
 from tying the sale of caskets to the purchase of crema-
 tion services.' A 1978 FTC regulation prohibited oph-
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 thalmologists and optometrists from requiring customers
 to purchase their eyeglasses from the same provider who
 conducted their eye examination.2 The FTC is also
 investigating state prohibitions on denturism, the prac-
 tice of dental laboratory technicians selling dentures
 directly to the public without the involvement of a
 dentist. State prohibitions on denturism effectively tie
 the sale of dentures to the services provided by dentists
 (Kushman, 1983). In each of these cases, tying require-
 ments are found in industries with many sellers. Yet in
 each of these industries sellers have some degree of
 market power as a result of licensing laws and imperfect
 consumer information.
 This paper examines the effect of tying requirements
 on the prices and qualities of goods and services offered
 by sellers with some degree of market power in rela-
 tively unconcentrated markets. Accordingly, the analy-
 sis incorporates elements from the traditional commod-
 ity bundling literature which analyzes the use of tying
 requirements to increase the profits of monopolists
 (Bowman, 1957; Stigler, 1968; Adams and Yellen, 1976;
 and Schmalensee, 1982) and the more recent literature
 which analyzes the use of tying requirements by sellers
 in unconcentrated markets (Craswell, 1982). In particu-
 lar, this paper presents an econometric study of the
 economic impact of state restrictions that prohibit the
 fitting of contact lenses by opticians, and thereby tie the
 sale of contact lenses to the services of ophthalmologists
 and optometrists.
 Current regulatory policy toward opticians' scope of
 practice is based on the assumption that the market
 fails because (1) consumers are faced with the dilemma
 of selecting an ophthalmologist, optometrist, or optician
 without the benefit of full information on the quality of
 services provided and (2) opticians, in particular, may
 exploit this asymmetric information by providing lower
 quality services. This assumption has led to the in-
 ference that restricting opticians' ability to indepen-
 dently fit contact lenses is necessary to protect con-
 sumers from their own purchase decisions and from
 unfair seller behavior.
 Although there is theoretical support for the argu-
 ment that imperfect consumer information will result in
 market failure (Akerlof, 1970), an FTC study (1983)
 concluded that the difference between the quality of
 contact lens fittings by ophthalmologists, optometrists,
 and opticians is not statistically significant. This result
 suggests that state restrictions on contact lens fittings by
 opticians may not be necessary to protect consumers.
 The FTC, however, did not include tying requirements
 in their empirical analysis and thus did not test the
 effect of tying requirements on price or quality. In
 addition, the FTC did n t control for variations in
 demand, production costs, state commercial practice
 restrictions, or state licensing requirements.
 I. Tying Requirements in the Market for
 Contact Lenses
 The traditional antitrust objection to tying require-
 ments, the requirement that the purchaser of one prod-
 uct, the tying product, purchase a second, tied product
 from the same seller, is based on the assumption that
 sellers with market power in the tying good market will
 use tie-in sales to exclude competitors in the tied good
 market and thereby extend their market power into the
 tied good market. Economists, however, have ques-
 tioned this "leverage" theory of tie-in sales. If the tying
 and tied goods are consumed jointly and in fixed pro-
 portions, then an increase in the price of the tied good
 will, ceteris paribus, decrease demand for the tied and
 the tying good. Rather, economists have suggested that
 monopolists may use tying requirements to increase
 profits through price discrimination (Bowman, 1957) or
 through strategies of pure and mixed bundling (Stigler,
 1968, Adams and Yellen, 1976, and Schmalensee, 1982).
 Tying requirements may have an exclusionary effect,
 however, if the tying and tied goods are complements
 and consumed in variable proportions (Bowman, 1957),
 the sale of the tied product for use with the tying
 product represents a substantial share of all sales of the
 tied product (Posner, 1976), or the purpose of the tying
 requirement is to protect the reputation of the seller of
 the tying good (Posner, 1976). Sellers may engage in
 tying to protect their reputations when consumers can
 evaluate the performance of the bundle but not the
 performance of the tying and tied good separately.
 Thus, the reputation of the tying good seller is not hurt
 by the use of low quality tied goods (Craswell, 1982).
 This discussion suggests that the evaluation of the
 legality of tying requirements in the market for contact
 lenses should include an assessment of the effect of the
 tying requirement on both price and quality.
 The purchase of contact lenses is a three step process.
 First, the consumer must go to an ophthalmologist or
 optometrist to obtain a refractive eye examination and
 contact lens perscription. Opticians are not allowed to
 prescribe contact lenses. Then the potential contact lens
 consumer requires a keratometric or fitting examination
 to measure the radius of curvature of the cornea. Fi-
 nally the lenses must be purchased and their fit
 evaluated.
 In twenty-two states tying requirements between the
 refractive eye examination or contact lens prescription
 and the contact lenses are imposed indirectly by laws
 which prohibit the fitting of contact lenses by indepen-
 dent opticians (opticians practicing independently from
 2Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and Services, Trade Reg-
 ulation Rule, 43 Fed. Reg. 23, 992 (1978).
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 optometrists or ophthalmologists). The laws in four of
 these states3 prohibit the fitting of contact lenses by any
 optician. In sixteen states4 the laws permit opti-
 cians to fit contact lenses, but only under the supervi-
 sion of ophthalmologists and optometrists. In Alabama,
 Florida, and the District of Columbia opticians may
 dispense contact lenses, but only with a prescription
 that includes both refractive test information and
 post-refractive eye measurements.
 II. The Model and Empirical Results
 Following a symmetric oligopoly model developed by
 Cubbin (1974) and extended by Waterson (1984), sellers
 producing a heterogeneous product are assumed to
 maximize profits with respect to price. Thus, each seller
 will have a profit function:
 Flj = p, q - C, ( q, ) j = 1, 2, ... ., N (1)
 where qj = fj ( P1 P2' ... I PN)- Accordingly, ophthalmic
 supplierj sets price to satisfy:
 Pj = C' [1 - (1/(aE + (1 - a)ej)) (2)
 where
 [YiJ (dpi1dpj)( aqj1api)]
 a Y-i * j ay qjaQ pi
 Pj is a function of supplierj's marginal costs Cj, the
 weighted average of sellers' conjectural variations with
 respect to price a, the market elasticity of demand
 when dp1/dpj 1, E, and sellerj's elasticity of demand
 when dp1/dpj 0, ej.
 The determinants of Cj' are the prices of inputs
 (INPUT), the implicit price of sellerj's own time, and
 the type of contact lenses supplied (SOFT). The im-
 plicit price of a seller's time depends on the number of
 hours worked and seller type-whether the seller who
 fit the contact lenses is an ophthalmologist, optometrist,
 or optician (FIT-OPTYPEj) and whether the seller who
 provided the refractive eye exam is an ophthalmologist
 or optometrist (EX-OPTYPEj). As a seller works longer
 hours, the value of his/her time increases. Hours worked
 will depend on both the quality of services provided
 (QUALITYJ) and demand for services (measured as per
 capita income Y) relative to the number of sellers (N).
 Assuming higher quality lens fittings require more labor
 time, marginal costs will increase as quality increases.
 Assuming sellers work longer hours when demand in-
 creases, marginal costs will increase as Y increases
 relative to N. The implicit price of sellers' time will vary
 by seller type due to differences in ophthalmologists',
 optometrists', and opticians' investments in education
 and abilities to realize economies of scale and scope.
 Sellers' conjectural variations with respect to price
 will depend on the extent to which competitors' abilities
 to compete are constrained. Sellers practicing in states
 with restrictions on the business practices of optom-
 etrists (REG and R-AD) and opticians (R-FIT) may
 believe dp1/dpj is closer to zero. REG includes restric-
 tions on (1) the use of trade names, (2) the employment
 of optometrists by lay persons or corporations, (3) the
 number of branch offices an optometrist may operate,
 and (4) locating offices in mercantile locations. R-FIT
 and R-AD are state restrictions on contact lens fittings
 by opticians and advertising, respectively.
 E and ej depend on the level of consumer informa-
 tion which in turn depends on the number of sellers
 (Pauly and Satterthwaite, 1981) and the level of adver-
 tising (Nelson, 1974). The level of advertising chosen by
 supplierj is assumed to be a function of Pj and QUAL-
 ITYj (Nelson, 1974 and Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984),
 supplier type,5 and R-AD:
 Aj = gj(Pj, QUALITYJ, FIT-OPTYPEJ,
 EX-OPTYPEJ, R-AD). (3)
 The number of ophthalmic suppliers depends on
 market profitability or demand, measured as Y
 (Newhouse, Williams, Schwartz, Bennett, 1982), state
 licensure requirements (Benham, Maurizi, and Reder,
 1968), and the regulatory environment (Meltzer, Lang-
 well, Keane, and Nelson, 1983):
 N = b(Y, REG, R-AD, R-FIT, LIC). (4)
 State restrictions on the business practices of optom-
 etrists may deter entry by optometrists. And as dis-
 cussed earlier, R-FIT may have an exclusionary effect
 on opticians. Further it is expected that fewer opticians
 will locate in the twenty-one states that require their
 licensure (LIC).
 Equations (2) through (4) can be solved implicitly for
 1' as a function of the variables-n which Cj', a, E, ej,
 Aj, and N depend:
 Pj = hj(QUALITYJ, R-FIT, REG, R-AD,
 LIC, FIT-OPTYPE1, EX-OPTYPEj,
 SOFTJ, INPUT, Y). (5)
 To test the effect of state contact lens fitting restric-
 tions on the quality of contact lens fittings, an expanded
 version of the FTC's (1983) regression model is esti-
 mated. The FTC's model included (1) contact lens
 3 Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Vermont.
 4Alaska, California, Colorado, Deleware, Florida, Hawaii,
 Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, Oregon,
 South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
 5Approximately 74% of opticians, 45% of optometrists, and
 32% of ophthalmologists choose to advertise. 20/20 Magazine
 (Nov./Dec. 1985), p. 86.
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 wearer characteristics that may influence quality of fit
 (WEARER), such as age, sex, wearing time prior to the
 FTC exam, and average hours worn per day, (2) lens
 characteristics that may influence fit quality (LENS),
 such as type, cleanliness, damage, and warpage, and (3)
 the type of supplier who fit the contact lens.
 The FTC's quality model is expanded to include the
 package price of the contact lenses because suppliers are
 assumed to choose price and quality jointly. Further the
 FTC's model is expanded to include a measure of the
 difficulty of fitting contact lenses for a particular con-
 sumer (FAIL), and the four state regulatory variables:
 QUA LITYJ = aj ( WEARERj, LENSj,
 FIT-OPTYPEj, Pj, FAILj,
 R-FIT, R-AD, LIC, REG). (6)
 FAIL equals one if the consumer tried to wear contact
 lenses before, but was unsuccessful, and zero otherwise.
 As the degree of difficulty of fitting the contact lenses
 increases, quality of the contact lens fitting may de-
 crease. State commercial practice restrictions and licens-
 ing requirements may increase the level of quality.6
 QUA LITYJ and Pj are endogenous. Accordingly, the
 effects of state tying requirements on quality and price
 are estimated using two stage least squares regression
 (2SLS).
 The FTC data include the price and quality of the
 contact lenses provided by a sample of 354 ophthalmol-
 ogists, optometrists, and opticians between 1976 and
 1979 in 18 urban areas. Quality is measured as an index
 of the contact lens wearer's eye health or the relative
 presence of seven potentially pathological eye condi-
 tions caused by poorly fitted contact lenses. Price is
 measured as the adjusted package price of the eye
 examination, keratometric examination, and the contact
 lenses.7 These data are described in more detail in FTC
 (Dec. 1983).
 The Empirical Results
 The results of regressions that test the effect of state
 tying requirements on contact lens prices, controlling
 for differences in quality are reported in table 1.8 Using
 the linear and log-linear form the null hypothesis that
 the coefficient on R-FIT is equal to zero can be rejected
 at the 5% and the 10% levels of significance, respec-
 tively. The results suggest that contact lens prices are
 approximately $17.30 or 8% higher in states with the
 contact lens fitting restriction. With respect to the rela-
 tionship between price and quality, the results suggest
 that quality, measured as eye health, does not have a
 statistically significant effect on price.
 Restrictions on the commercial-practices of optom-
 etrists are also associated with higher contact lens prices,
 controlling for quality differences in both regressions.
 This is consistent with an earlier study that found
 eyeglass prices are higher in states with commercial
 practice restrictions (Haas-Wilson, 1986). State licens-
 ing requirements for opticians and the advertising
 restriction, however, have statistically insignificant
 effects on contact lens prices. Earlier studies found that
 eyeglass prices were higher in states with advertising
 restrictions (Benham, 1972; Feldman and Begun, 1978).
 The difference may be due to the fact that the earlier
 studies did not control for the presence of other com-
 mercial practice restrictions.
 TABLE 1.-2SLS REGRESSIONS ON PRICE
 (standard errors in parentheses)a
 PRICE ln( PRICE)
 CONSTANT 167.30f 7.07f
 (43.29) (1.65)
 SOFT 53.92 0.31
 (6.48) (0.04)
 FITOPH 17.87d 0.10
 (10.84) (0.07)
 FITOPTOM 2.72 0.00
 (13.93) (0.09)
 EXOPH 28.48e 0.15d
 (13.77) (0.09)
 yb -0.01 -0.24
 (0.00) (0.20)
 INPUT -18.52 -0.19
 (39.06) (0.24)
 QUALWC -0.64 0.00
 (0.88) (0.01)
 R-FIT 17.29e 0.08d
 (7.85) (0.05)
 LIC -4.45 0.02
 (7.33) (0.05)
 R-A D 22.89d 0.10
 (13.29) (0.08)
 REG 9.141 0.04e
 (3.07) (0.02)
 N= 354 N= 354
 R2= 0.29 R2 = 0.26
 F = 12.73 F = 10.98
 a Estimated standard errors adjusted as suggested by Maddala (1977) at
 239.
 b Ln( Y) for the log-linear regression.
 Predicted values.
 d Significant at the 10% level of significance.
 ' Significant at the 5% level of significance.
 f Significant at the 1% level of significance.
 6 Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 1980).
 7"The contact lens package price charged to each subject
 was deflated by a cost of living index derived from a Bur au of
 Labor Statistics survey of family budgets for 39 cities. Indices
 were keyed to both the city of fit and year of fit." FTC, Dec.
 1983, at C-3.
 8The reported regressions use QUALW as the measure of fit
 quality. Estimation of equation (5) using QUA LU gives similar
 results.
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 TABLE 2.-2SLS REGRESSION ON QUALITY
 (standard errors in parentheses) a
 QUALW QUALU
 CONSTANT 8.02 2.04
 (9.08) (3.45)
 FITOPH 3.39 1.17
 (2.68) (1.02)
 FITOPTOM - 0.06 0.11
 (2.01) (0.77)
 pb - 0.08 -0.03
 (0.07) (0.03)
 SEX 3.61- 1.23
 (1.57) (0.60)
 A GE - 0.07 - 0.03
 (0.07) (0.03)
 FA IL - 2.83 -1.04
 (1.91) (0.73)
 WEA RTIME -0.83e -0.31e
 (0.29) (0.11)
 HOURS - 0.83c - 0.29c
 (0.47) (0.18)
 DIRT - 1.65c - 0.56
 (1.03) (0.39)
 DAMAGE 1.03 0.38
 (0.87) (0.33)
 WA RP 0.07 -0.17
 (1.09) (0.41)
 SOFT 7.85 2.71c
 (4.10) (1.56)
 R-FIT -0.10 -0.18
 (1.46) (0.55)
 R-A D 0.06 -0.48
 (2.30) (0.87)
 LIC - 0.53 -0.19
 (1.31) (0.50)
 REG 0.53 -0.01
 (0.67) (0.26)
 N= 354 N= 354
 R2 = 0.14 R2 = 0.14
 F= 3.51 F= 3.29
 Estimated standard errors adjusted as suggested by Maddala (1977) at
 239.
 b Predicted values.
 Significant at the 10% level of significance.
 d Significant at the 5% level of significance.
 Significant at the 1% level of significance.
 Equation (6) is estimated in linear form using two
 measures of quality-a weighted index of eye health
 (QUALW) and an unweighted index of eye health
 (QUALU).9 The results in table 2 suggest that state
 tying requirements in the market for contact lenses have
 a statistically insignificant effect on fit quality. Further
 it appears the quality provided by opticians is not
 significantly different than that provided by optometrists
 or ophthalmologists. This is consistent with the FTC's
 (1983) finding. Finally, the results suggest that advertis-
 ing restrictions, commercial practice restrictions, and
 opticians' licensing requirements have statistically insig-
 nificant effects on quality.
 Conclusions
 While a large body of empirical evidence exists on the
 effects of advertising and other commercial practice
 restrictions in the market for eyeglasses, this is the first
 study of the effects of tying requirements and commer-
 cial practice restrictions in the market for contact lenses.
 The results suggest that state restrictions which effec-
 tively tie the sale of contact lenses to eye examinations
 by prohibiting opticians from independently fitting con-
 tact lenses increase the total price of contact lenses by
 approximately 8%, controlling for differences in quality
 and variations in other state restrictions. This in combi-
 nation with the finding that state contact lens fitting
 restrictions have a statistically insignificant effect on
 quality suggests that the restrictions are benefiting pro-
 viders rather than consumers of contact lenses.
 ' The quality regressions were also estimated separately for
 soft and hard contact lenses. This changed the significance of
 some of the WEARER and LENS variables; however, it did
 not change the significance of any of the regulatory variables.
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 SHEEPSKIN EFFECTS IN THE RETURNS TO EDUCATION
 Thomas Hungerford and Gary Solon*
 Abstract-Some previous discussions have dismissed screening
 theories of education partly on the ground that diploma years
 of education do not confer especially large earnings gains.
 Similarly, most empirical research on earnings functions has
 assumed an absence of "sheepskin" effects. We report evi-
 dence, however, of substantial and statistically significant
 sheepskin effects. Although this suggests that the previous
 dismissals of the screening hypothesis were premature, our
 evidence of sheepskin effects is amenable to nonscreening
 interpretations also.
 According to screening theories of education, individ-
 uals with more schooling tend to earn more not because
 (or, at least, not solely because) schooling makes them
 more productive, but rather because it credentiates them
 as more productive. A frequently cited article by Layard
 and Psacharopoulos (1974), however, dismissed the im-
 portance of the screening hypothesis on the grounds
 that several of its refutable predictions were not sup-
 ported by available evidence. One of these was the
 "sheepskin" prediction that "wages will rise faster with
 extra years of education when the extra year also con-
 veys a certificate." After surveying a number of studies,
 Layard and Psacharopoulous (henceforth LP) con-
 cluded that "rates of return to dropouts are as high as
 to those who complete a course, which refutes the
 sheepskin version of the screening hypothesis."
 Since publication of the LP paper, an undergraduate
 labor economics textbook' has cited LP's analysis of
 sheepskin effects as "telling criticism" of the screening
 hypothesis. A prominent proponent of the screening
 hypothesis, Riley (1979), has accepted LP's summary of
 the empirical evidence, but responded that some ver-
 sions of the screening hypothesis do not imply sheep-
 skin effects. In the meantime, the ongoing flood of
 empirical research on earnings functions typically has
 continued to treat the natural logarithm of the wage
 rate as a linear (or occasionally quadratic) function of
 years of education, with no allowance for discontinui-
 ties in diploma years.2
 The estimated rates of return used by LP were based
 on data that did not disaggregate dropouts' earnings by
 how many years of school they had completed. LP
 acknowledged, "We would have preferred to show the
 earnings gain associated with each year of the course,
 including the year when it was successfully completed."
 This note presents a reanalysis of sheepskin effects
 based on the type of data LP wished they had. The
 results contain very strong evidence of sheepskin effects
 after all. The next section describes our analysis, and
 the following section summarizes and discusses our
 results.
 Empirical Analysis
 Our analysis is based on May 1978 Current Popula-
 tion Survey data on white male nonagricultural wage
 and salary workers between the ages of 25 and 64. The
 uncommonly large sample size in this data set (16,498
 observations) enables relatively precise estimation of
 nonlinear returns to education.
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 * The University of Michigan.
 The authors thank Charles Brown and the referees for their
 comments.
 1 Addison and Siebert (1979, p. 139).
 2 There have been occasional exceptions, however, such as
 Goodman (1979), Mohan (1981), Olneck (1979), and Weiss
 (1984).
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